UN Secretary-General Releases Congo Peace Plan

Analysis: UN Secretary-General Releases Congo Peace Plan

London (GLCSS) 2 June 2006

By William Church

Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently made public his Security Council mandated plan to remove the armed groups from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This report was requested in December 2005 pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 14 of Resolution 1649 (2005) by the Security Council to be delivered on 15 March 2006. It followed the Security Council’s November 2005 trip to the Great Lakes Region, and an October meeting of the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, which requested sanctions and other actions against the various armed groups in the Eastern DRC.

In the five-month period between the Security Council request and the Secretary-General plan, MONUC, has articulated and executed a clear and concise military action plan. As discussed in the Great Lakes Centre for Strategic Studies (GLCSS) Weekly News and Analysis in September and November 2005, MONUC, the UN mission in the DRC) moved to disrupt the command and control of all the armed groups and deprived them of established bases of operation. In addition, they have mounted sustained operations and increased area domination activities in especially North and South Kivu.

MONUC, in Ituri, has interpreted their mandate as an aggressive Chapter VII and have engaged the armed groups with the intent to kill or capture and forcefully remove them. However, the Kivus have been a different story. MONUC has maintained its area domination activities within the parameters of the pre-established strategy of voluntary repatriation for the FDLR, the largest foreign group in the DRC which contains elements that committed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

In terms of Rwandans’ repatriation, some 5426 ex-combatants have gone through the demobilization center at Mutobo, Rwanda. At the current pace, 2006 will appear to be the best year for repatriations since 2001 with 629 already demobilized ex-combatants at the half year mark. This contrasts a mere 287 repatriations in 2005. However, it remains questionable that voluntary repatriation is a viable strategy for the FDLR.

According to the Security-General report, this leaves between 8,000 and 9,000 FDLR split between North and South Kivu. The report also estimates there are approximately 600 ADF left in far North Kivu and only a few hundred, at most, FNL in South Kivu near the Burundi border.

The Security-General’s plan articulates a long-term strategy: “MONUC strongly believes that the way to resolve what remains of the foreign group problem is to support and maintain a long-term coordinated and comprehensive effort by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to extend State authority to the entire territory of the country as early as possible and enforce law and order.” He also discounts the current period and suggests that the process will accelerate after the elections.

This long-term approach, according to the report, will support a series of actions that will assist with the coordinated removal of the FDLR, and first among that list is an effort to isolate or separate FDLR hard-line political and military leaders from rank-and-file elements. GLCSS believes this will prove to be an elusive goal since the density of the FDLR in North Kivu has increased since MONUC’s Operation South Sentinel in South Kivu forced nearly 1000 FDLR into North Kivu and into the control of many hard-line military leaders. (See GLCSS Weekly News and Analysis 28 April 2006)

It was also revealed in the report that MONUC is working on two immediate plans to further restrict the FDLR. It has planned an intensive military campaign to disrupt cross-border illegal traffic in both directions in order to undermine any support or collaboration the foreign armed groups might receive from local businesses, and second, MONUC is in the process of researching and preparing a list of Congolese traders believed to be collaborating with the FDLR.

In addition, the report also targets six recommendations for the affected countries of the region:

The countries of the region should strengthen the exchange of information and real time data on the FDLR and specifically target their supply lines through local and international mechanisms.

GLCSS Note: The Tripartite Plus Joint Commission’s May meeting agreed to improve the Fusion Intelligence cell so this issue has been already addressed.

Encourage bilateral cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC using the Tripartite and the Joint Verification Mechanism.

GLCSS Note: After a nearly six month delay, the Tripartite met in April and May to solidify their October 2005 recommendations. This process is being driven by the United States, with the full cooperation of the Tripartite countries. The Joint Verification Mechanism has been little used in the last six months because of the build up to the elections in the DRC.

Intensification of sensitization efforts particularly with regard to the reintegration incentive package.

Establishment and publication of a list of FDLR members accused of serious crimes by the Government of Rwanda.

GLCSS Note: Rwanda published, two weeks ago, a list of 93 names, including FDLR members, who are accused of genocide crimes. The open question is if it should be interpreted as a signal that other members of the FDLR will not face criminal prosecution. Once repatriated FDLR and completion of their course at Mutobo, they are still subject to the local Gacaca process.

Broadening the Security Council sanctions list against individuals to include the leaders of foreign armed groups and when possible, their financial backers.

GLCSS Note: The Tripartite Plus Commission has prepared a list of individuals for sanctions, and it is waiting approval by the appropriate ministers of each country. The Commission expects their list to be supported by the African Union and the United Nations Sanctions Committee.

Strengthening border controls and immigration mechanisms between countries of the region, and identifying other economic means to cut off the supply of goods and funds available to the foreign armed groups.

GLCSS Note: The UN Experts were mandated to perform this task in January 2004. Even though they were specifically requested by the Security Council to perform this task, the UN Experts in four reports over a two year period have never addressed the issue of financial support for the FDLR, which is the largest foreign armed group in the DRC and responsible for a range of human rights abuses. Last November, the Security Council attempted to address this omission and requested the Experts to specifically focus on the FDLR; however, their subsequent report in January 2006 failed, once again, to address the FDLR economic network issue.

Finally, the Security-General questions the core question of the future of the armed groups. He writes:

“Among the outstanding concerns to be considered with regard to the problem of foreign armed groups in the DRC is whether the principle objective of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration is still the repatriation of combatants or whether there may be other options that can be raised with regional stakeholders.”

There are serious issues that have not been addressed in the Secretary-General plan. As reported in GLCSS Weekly News and Analysis 19 September 2005, the military options of MONUC are limited and the options suggested by GLCSS nine months ago remain viable and were included in the Secretary-General’s plan. The remaining issues are two fold and supersede the mere enforcement of the 1999 Arusha Ceasefire and the supporting treaties.

First, the FDLR—as a primary focus because they are the largest armed group--must be disarmed for the DRC to extend its state authority to the Kivus. This was first suggested by GLCSS as a key issue in an October 2005 opinion piece that pointed out the issue was not the FDLR, but it was governance by the Kabila government. In GLCSS Weekly News and Analysis 19 May 2006, the following best describes the future scenario:

“The real issue for the future of the DRC is one of Kabila’s character. The terms of the Global Accords linked together politicians with military warlords, and a Kabila presidential victory and a PPRD majority in the National Assembly will allow Joseph Kabila to demonstrate, with his own government, if he is a reformer with a mandate to change the DRC or if the plunder of the DRC will continue unabated.”

The Secretary-General suggestion to reexamine the repatriation issue might allow the Kabila government to break through the situation that GLCSS has described as a stalemate between the government and the FDLR. It is obvious that any military solution will cause numerous civilian deaths and displacement at a time when stability is much needed. In essence, the UN has taken the Kabila government down a one-way path. Ironically, the DRC needs stability after the election but it will not gain that stability with a military solution to dislodge the FDLR. In a perverse way, it might be argued that the time for action was 2004 and 2005 when the region was already unstable. Unfortunately, the UN’s promotion of a voluntarily repatriation strategy, even when it was obvious that it would not work, might be the reason that the DRC will not see stability in the near future.

Second, there is an important issue that has escaped action in the discussion, and it has importance not only for Rwanda but for the entire international community. Inside the ranks of the FDLR—both military and political—are individuals responsible for the 1994 genocide and individuals who financed the ongoing activities of the FDLR, who have committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law. These individuals have not only sought shelter and protection in the DRC but are also sheltered in the UK, France, Belgium, United States, and Germany. In many cases, they have operated with impunity as in the case of Ignace Murwanashyaka in Germany for over a decade.

The Secretary-General’s plan should have included a detailed approach that guaranteed that FDLR members and supporters who are responsible for the 1994 genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law will be brought to justice. GLCSS believes the primary reason for the importance of repatriation is so that those responsible for crimes can be identified, charged, and tried. The Secretary-General’s possible suggestion of an easy solution of disregarding the principle of repatriation, without a detailed plan to identify and charge all violators—not just the current list established by the Rwandan government--of international law, is not a solution that serves the best interest of future enforcement of international humanity law.

The Great Lakes Centre for Strategic Studies is. a London-based think tank
www.glcss.org

Blogger News Network

0 Comments:

Links to this post:

Previous Posts