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UN Has Difficulty Finding Darfur Peacekeepers

London (GLCSS)23 May 2006


Central Africa/Great Lakes Region remains one of the most volatile regions in the world because of its proximity to the instability of the Horn of Africa and domestic conflicts. The consequences of a failure by the African Union (AU), the international community and the United Nations to strategically plan and enforce a peace agreement in Darfur and maintain order along the Sudan/Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) borders will have a dire affect resulting in increased refugee populations, civilian deaths and human rights abuses, and possibly disruption of oil supplies for Africa and the rest of the world.

Currently, three out of four United Nations (UN) peacekeepers are stationed in Africa. Of the 71,823 uniformed, worldwide UN peacekeepers some 55,773 are stationed in Africa and of that figure some 31,889 or nearly half of the worldwide, UN peacekeepers are stationed in the Central Africa/Great Lakes Region, which includes Sudan and the Horn because of its geopolitical influence. In addition, there are 6,752 AU peacekeepers in Darfur to bring the regional peacekeeper total to 38,641.

In terms of projected needs, GLCSS believes that Africa’s near-term peacekeeper requirements offer very limited options to fulfill potentially mandated peacekeeper troop strengths primarily focused on Darfur. This concern is generated by an existing deficit in authorized troop strength, current requests for additional authorized peacekeepers, and projected conflicts in the region.

Current Authorized Deficits and Requested Additions

The primarily deficits exists today in both (UNAMIS and AMIS) Sudan missions. UNMIS is authorized 10,000 peacekeepers and has a current force of 8391 for a 1,609 UN deficit. AMIS (the AU mission to Darfur) has an authorized strength of 7,963 and has 6,752 deployed peacekeepers for a deficit of 1,211; therefore, the Sudan total deficit is 2,820 peacekeepers.

The trigger for additional AMIS soldiers or a UN force, incorporating the AMIS force, was the 5 May 2006 Abuja peace agreement. Salim A. Salim, African Union Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks informed the Security Council before the agreement was signed, “My plea,” he continued, “to the Council is not to wait for the transition from AMIS to the United Nations force to take place before strengthening the implementation mechanisms of any agreement to be reached in Abuja.”

Before the deployment of additional peacekeepers takes places place there must be agreement on the following issues:

·disengagement of forces
· redeployment, disarmament of the Janjaweed
· control and neutralization of militias
· policing and enhancing the security of the camps for internally displaced persons
·security of nomadic migration corridors
· the demilitarization of humanitarian supply routes.


US Ambassador John Bolton, in planning the transition of the AU force in Darfur to the UN, suggested 20,000-man total troop strength for Darfur, but others on the Security Council have suggested that 14,000 peacekeepers might be sufficient. It was also suggested that UNMIS might share troops or reassign troops to the Darfur mission which would reduce the requested figure.

In addition to the looming needs of Darfur, the Secretary-General has requested an additional 4,000 peacekeepers for Cote d’Ivoire. GLCSS believes the combination of the existing UNMIS/AMIS troop strength, new requests, and fulfillment of current troop deficits will produce a range of new peacekeeper demands of 9,820 (low-end estimate to produce 14,000 Darfur peacekeepers) to 13,820 (high-end estimate to produce 18,000 Darfur peacekeepers) peacekeepers, which will be targeted for Darfur. The Cote d’Ivoire troop request will be temporarily solved by Resolution 1667 (2006) which agrees to the redeployment of peacekeepers from the Liberia mission. However, this is only a temporary solution because the Liberian mission mandate expires 30 September and normally these types of agreements do not extend beyond the mandate period. This means that the UN Darfur force will absorb the current AMIS troops and, fill 2,820 of the authorized strength in UNMIS/AMIS, then agree to a sharing agreement with UN Darfur, and authorize 7,000 to 11,000 new peacekeepers for Darfur.

Potential Short-term to Mid-term Peacekeeper Requirements

Although the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is moving towards elections, many of its underlining problems have not been solved and GLCSS does not believe the current elections cycle will be finished before September 2006. This will dictate the maintenance of the current troop levels until at least the end of 2006, if not until the end of the first quarter of 2007. There will be little chance for redeployment of MONUC peacekeepers.

Regarding the FDLR, it seems highly unlikely that either additional MONUC peacekeepers or a UN authorized multinational force will be deployed to remove the FDLR in the short to mid-term. As discussed in the previous GLCSS analysis, the FDLR has achieved an effective stalemate strategy. The solution to the FDLR situation will take place in a Kigali-Kinshasa dialogue outside of UN or Tripartite Plus One Joint Commission boundaries. However, this solution will not be fully implemented until after the election of Joseph Kabila as the new president.

The UN mandate in Burundi expires on 1 July 2006 and it seems likely that ONUB’s authorized troop strength will be significantly reduced and/or more peacekeepers redeployed to the DRC. GLCSS believes the mandate will be extended until the end of September to coordinate with the end of the DRC elections and allow for continued redeployment of peacekeepers to the DRC. This means the ONUB peacekeepers could act as a rapid reaction force for the Eastern DRC to assist with evacuation, during the unlikely event of elections hostilities.

Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) have a growing potential for instability in the near future. Recently, Secretary-General Annan made it very clear that, based on previous agreements resulting from problems in the Great Lakes Region, the Security Council has an obligation to respond to aggression from one nation to another. GLCSS believes the Sudan-based rebels, who invaded last month, will act as a Security Council trigger.

This may trigger a Chad request for a Chapter VI force to monitor the border between Chad and Sudan. However, this would only take place if it had French support. The alternative solution would be the intervention of a UN authorized French force and/or the transition of the current French intervention force into a UN force in the late mid-term, which would be the first quarter of 2007.

The CAR has a strong potential for conflict; however, it seems unlikely that the UN will be involved in the short to mid-term. However, if the security situation continues to deteriorate during 2007 and erupts into large scale fighting in the first quarter of 2007, there may be difficulty in meeting this long term demand.

GLCSS forecasts the potential (currently non-requested or unauthorized) peacekeeper needs for the Chad/Sudan conflict to be 1,500 to be either deployed in Chad or added to the authorized Darfur/UNMIS missions to secure the border between the two countries.

Short-term and Mid-term UN Peacekeeper Forecast

The above analysis produces a requested and potentially authorized requirement of 9,820 to 13,820 peacekeepers for Darfur and a predicted requirement of 1,500 peacekeepers for Chad for a total range of 11,320 to 15,320. This includes 2,820 to complete the authorized levels of UNMIS/AMIS, 7,000 to 11,000 additional peacekeepers for Darfur, and 1,500 to monitor the Chad/Sudan border.

Available UN Peacekeepers in Short to Mid-term

The failure or difficulty of the United Nations to field an authorized peacekeeper force is now well documented. The United States plays a crucial role not because it provides peacekeepers but because it funds 27 percent of all peacekeeping operations. At the G8 2004 Summit President Bush proposed and the other G8 members agreed to a five-year program to support training and equipment for 75,000 peacekeepers. This program has been slow to be funded and is not considered fully operational today.

Regardless, if it was funded or operational, there are already nearly 72,000 peacekeepers in the field and the current projections push that number to the 83, 320 to 87,320 range, which is a record high. It begs the questions of the ability of the United Nations to meet its peacekeeper needs.

There has been a lot of discussion in Africa of Africans shouldering the responsibility of peacekeeping. To that end, there has been the unfilled promise of a range of African Standby Brigades, which has only just started to take hold. But the reality shows that Africans are already shouldering a large share of the responsibility with 21,586 soldiers already deployed between UN and AU forces. This accounts for nearly 35 percent of all peacekeepers in Africa and 27 percent of all peacekeepers. This is both good news and bad news because many of the African countries that are most capable of providing peacekeepers already have significant commitments.

Nigeria has 4,496 peacekeepers, South Africa 2,331, Morocco 1,578, Ghana 2,584, Ethiopia 2,772 and Rwanda 1.756. With the possible exception of Angola and Egypt, Africa appears to have an elasticity of no more than two to three thousand additional peacekeepers.

South Asia is the other regional peacekeeper powerhouse; however, it looks equally as over extended. Four countries—Bangladesh (10,255), India (9,061), Nepal (3,498), and Pakistan (9,638)—provide a backbone for African peacekeeping. In other words, South Asia provides 45 percent of world’s peacekeeping needs and their elasticity is highly questionable considering their long deployment in the DRC and other locations. It is important to note that this loss of regional elasticity is not just a loss of manpower, but it is also a loss of combat support air power, air mobile troop transport, and firepower.

In other words, nearly 70 percent of the existing peacekeeper capability has very little room for expansion, in the opinion of GLCSS. There might be some relief from missions that are in the process of demobilizing. Top on this list is the UN mission in Liberia which, as discussed earlier, has a mandate expiring in the next six months and it is very likely that its 15,000 peacekeepers will be significantly reduced. However, some 4,000 of those soldiers are already promised to Cote d’Ivoire, and it is not realistic to expect a surplus before the November or December 2006 timeframe.

There is a possibility some of the 3,923 troops from the Burundi mission will become available, but once again, GLCSS believes the ONUB mandate will be extended to coordinate with MONUC and once again GLCSS doubts this will create any significant elasticity in the system until the October or November timeframe.

The most likely candidates for additional peacekeepers are Angola and Egypt which would satisfy the government of Sudan’s call for African troops on its soil. In addition, these countries have the equipment required for a rapid response force that Darfur demands. The third possibility would be Kenya but considering its very low participation in AMIS, this might be an indicator of capabilities. Uganda has the necessary manpower and equipment but seems an unlikely contributor because of its relationship with the government of South Sudan and its geopolitical politics.

Finally, it seems unlikely that the United States, Europe or China will contribute sufficient manpower. The US for a wide range of reasons contributes very few peacekeepers, Europe just dedicated nearly 1,500 soldiers to stabilize the DRC, and China has extensive political and military involvements with Sudan, which would not encourage participation.

GLCSS reinforces Salim Salim’s comments and believes the UN Security Council will find it difficult to fulfill the mandatory troop strengths from traditional peacekeeper countries unless it has already gained the commitments of Angola and Egypt. It seems doubtful that Egypt could contribute more than a UN-sized brigade of 3,500 peacekeepers considering its national security issues, and there have been rumors of a combat-ready 6,000 man Angolan force that was earmarked for the DRC, which now can be redirected to Darfur. Finally, now that South Africa’s involvement in Burundi has been reduced, it might produce enough elasticity for 1,000 South Africans peacekeepers to be deployed in Darfur.

The above estimates only cover the low-end estimate of peacekeeper requirements. In reality, the United Nations peacekeeper capacity will be overstretched meeting the minimum demand for the next nine months. Any of the following factors, could significantly increase the demand and break an already overstretched system:

Ambassador Bolton’s high-end estimate proves correct
Prolonged or increased instability in the DRC
Civil War in the CAR
Larger-scale fighting and a resulting peace treaty to supervise in Chad
Deteriorating security in Cote d’Ivoire
Increased peacekeeper requirements for the Oceania region

In addition, these estimates do not take into consideration external factors. This weekend, Osama Bin Laden asked his followers to fight any potential UN force in Darfur. This may not be a hollow threat. Al-Qaeda forces have been active in the Horn for a number of years and Sudan was his home prior to being forced out to Afghanistan. In addition, US intelligence has predicted that Al-Qaeda forces will return to the Horn once they are forced out of Afghanistan and Iraq.

GLCSS is a London-based think tank

www.glcss.org